SUMMARY In this paper, we formally define and analyze the security notions of authenticated encryption in unconditional security setting. For confidentiality, we define the notions, APS (almost perfect secrecy) and NM (non-malleability), in terms of an information-theoretic viewpoint along with our model where multiple senders and receivers exist. For authenticity, we define the notions, IntC (integrity of ciphertexts) and IntP (integrity of plaintexts), from a view point of information theory. And then we combine the above notions to define the security notions of unconditionally secure authenticated encryption. Then, we analyze relations among the security notions. In particular, it is shown that the strongest security notion is the combined notion of APS and IntC. Finally, we formally define and analyze the following generic composition methods in the unconditional security setting along with our model: Encrypt-and-Sign, Sign-then-Encrypt and Encrypt-then-Sign. Consequently, it is shown that: the Encrypt-and-Sign composition method is not always secure; the Sign-then-Encrypt composition method is not always secure; and the Encrypt-then-Sign composition method is always secure, if a given encryption meets APS and a given signature is secure.

key words: unconditional security, encryption, authenticated encryption, signcryption

1. Introduction

Confidentiality (secrecy) and authenticity are currently fundamental cryptographic functions, and encryption and signature are usually used for providing confidentiality and authenticity, respectively. Although encryption and signature have been mainly studied in the separate context, there are many applications where both are needed. A cryptographic technique which provides both confidentiality and authenticity is often called authenticated encryption, and we also use this term in this paper. In order to study the authenticated encryption, it is important to have a formal notion of what a secure authenticated encryption scheme is, and to construct an authenticated encryption which can be proven to be secure in the formal notion. In this paper, we formally define and analyze the security notions of authenticated encryption in unconditional security setting.

1.1 Related Works

Computational Security: Joint signature and encryption is studied in the public-key setting in [20] with the aim of achieving greater efficiency than simply carrying out signature and encryption separately. We remark that in [20] the term signcryption is introduced to represent the notion of joint signature and encryption instead of authenticated encryption. Recently, the proofs for the security of signcryption are provided in [2].

Very recently, in [1] the notions of joint encryption and signature are formally studied in the public-key setting. The paper [1] formally defines confidentiality and authenticity for authenticated encryption (signcryption) and analyzes the security of authenticated encryption (signcryption) designed by three types of generic compositions based on the use of a public-key encryption and a digital signature: Encrypt-then-Sign, Sign-then-Encrypt, and Commit-then-Encrypt-then-Sign.

On the other hand, in [4] and [15], joint notions of confidentiality and authenticity for symmetric encryption schemes are considered. In particular, in [4] formal definitions of secrecy and authenticity for symmetric encryption schemes are presented, and relations among the notions are revealed. In addition, the paper [4] analyzes the security of authenticated encryption schemes designed by three types of generic compositions based on the use of a symmetric encryption scheme and a MAC: Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-Encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC.

Unconditional Security: In unconditional security setting, cryptographic schemes which provide both authenticity and confidentiality have been studied (for example, see [6], [7], [16], [19]). The security notions for authenticity are mainly impersonation and substitution (spoofing). However, as shown in [12], [18], there exist stronger security notions and it is not enough to only consider impersonation and substitution (spoofing) if we require strong security for authenticity. On the other hand, the security notion for confidentiality under consideration in existing authenticated encryption schemes is mainly the perfect secrecy introduced by Shannon [17]. However, in addition to the notion, we should also consider the notion of non-malleability from an
In this paper, as mentioned before, we formally define and analyze the security notions of authenticated encryption in unconditional security setting.

For confidentiality, we introduce the notions, APS (almost perfect secrecy) and NM (non-malleability), in terms of an information-theoretic viewpoint along with our model where multiple senders and receivers exist. The notion of APS is a straightforward relaxed notion of perfect secrecy by Shannon [17]. The notion NM is newly defined in the context of unconditional security based on the idea of NM in computational security [3], [4], [8], [9]. On the other hand, for authenticity, we define the notions, IntC (integrity of ciphertexts) and IntP (integrity of plaintexts), from a viewpoint of information theory along with our model. The notions, IntC and IntP, are newly defined in the context of unconditional security based on the idea of that of computational security setting [4].

Next, we combine the above notions of confidentiality and authenticity to define the security notions of unconditionally secure authenticated encryption. And, we analyze relations among the security notions under consideration. As a result, in particular, it is shown that the strongest security notion is the combined notion of APS and IntC.

Finally, we formally define and analyze the following generic composition methods in the unconditional security setting along with our model: Encrypt-and-Sign, Sign-then-Encrypt, and Encrypt-then-Sign. Consequently, it is shown that: the Encrypt-and-Sign composition method is not always secure; the Sign-then-Encrypt composition method is not always secure; and the Encrypt-then-Sign composition method is always secure, if a given encryption meets APS and a given signature is secure.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, we formally define cryptographic models and formalize security notions from information-theoretic viewpoints. In particular, we define the model of authenticated encryption with unconditional security, and formalize the security notions, APS, NM, IntC and IntP, for authenticated encryption in unconditional security setting; in Sect. 3, we analyze relations among the security notions for authenticated encryption, and show that the strongest security notion is the combined notion of APS and IntC; and finally, in Sect. 4, we formally define and analyze the generic composition methods, Encrypt-and-Sign, Sign-then-Encrypt and Encrypt-then-Sign. In particular, we show that Encrypt-and-Sign and Sign-then-Encrypt methods are not always secure while Encrypt-then-Sign method is always secure, if a given encryption meets APS and a given signature is secure.

2. The Model

In this section, we consider cryptographic models and formalize security notions in terms of information theory.

In this paper, we use the following notations: For a finite set $\mathcal{X}$, let $X$ be a random variable which takes on the set $\mathcal{X}$ with probability distribution $p_X$. Here, the probability that $X$ takes a value $x \in \mathcal{X}$ is denoted by $p_X(x)$ and briefly $p_X(x)$ if $X$ and $\mathcal{X}$ are clear in the context. Also, let $X_1$ (resp. $X_2$) be a random variable which takes on the finite set $\mathcal{X}_1$ (resp. $\mathcal{X}_2$) with probability distribution $p_{X_1}$ (resp. $p_{X_2}$). Then, the conditional probability that $X_1 = x_1 (\in \mathcal{X}_1)$ given $X_2 = x_2 (\in \mathcal{X}_2)$ is denoted by $p_{X_1|X_2}(x_1|x_2)$ and briefly $p_{X_1|X_2}(x_1|x_2)$ if $X_1, X_2, X_1$ and $X_2$ are clear in the context.

2.1 A Model of Encryption and Authenticated Encryption Schemes with Unconditional Security

In this subsection, we describe a model of encryption and authenticated encryption with unconditional security, and introduce formal definitions of security.

First, we start with the following model of unconditionally secure encryption where multiple senders and receivers exist.

**Definition 1:** (Encryption) An encryption scheme $\Pi$ consists of $(\mathcal{U}, \mathcal{T}_A, \mathcal{M}, C, E, D, GEN, ENC, DEC)$:

1. **Notation:**
   - $\mathcal{U} := \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n, R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_m\}$ is a finite set of users, where $S_i (1 \leq i \leq n)$ are senders and $R_i (1 \leq i \leq m)$ are receivers. Let $\mathcal{U}_S := \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n\}$ and $\mathcal{U}_R := \{R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_m\}$. We also use $S_i$ (resp. $R_j$) as $S_i$’s (resp. $R_j$’s) identity.
   - $\mathcal{T}_A$ is a trusted authority.
   - $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}}$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible plaintexts. Here, $k$ is a security parameter and $\mathcal{M}_k \subset \{0, 1\}^{l_M(k)}$, where $l_M(k)$ is a polynomial of $k$.
   - $C = \{C_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}}$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible ciphertexts. Here, $C_k \subset \{0, 1\}^{l_C(k)}$, where $l_C(k)$ is a polynomial of $k$.
   - $E = \{E_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}}$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible encryption-keys. Here, $E_k \subset \{0, 1\}^{l_E(k)}$, where $l_E(k)$ is a polynomial of $k$.
   - $D = \{D_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}}$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible decryption-keys. Here, $D_k \subset \{0, 1\}^{l_D(k)}$, where $l_D(k)$ is a polynomial of $k$.
   - $\mathcal{GEN}$ is a key generation algorithm which outputs encryption-keys and decryption-keys.
   - $\mathcal{ENC} : E \times M \times \mathcal{U}_R \rightarrow C$ is an encryption algorithm.
   - $\mathcal{DEC} : D \times C \times \mathcal{U}_S \rightarrow M \cup \{\bot\}$ is a decryption algorithm.

2. Key Generation and Distribution by $\mathcal{T}_A$: The TA generates an encryption-key $e_i \in E$ for each sender $S_i$, and a decryption-key $d_j \in D$ for each receiver $R_j$ using the key generation algorithm $\mathcal{GEN}$. Here $\mathcal{GEN}$ is a probabilistic algorithm which produces,
on input $1^k$, where $k$ is a security parameter, keys $(e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n, d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n)$ of matching encryption and decryption keys, where $e_i \in E_k$ for $1 \leq i \leq n_1$ and $d_j \in D_k$ for $1 \leq j \leq n_2$. Then, $TA$ transmits the encryption-key $e_i$ to the sender $S_i$ and the decryption-key $d_j$ to the receiver $R_j$ via a secure channel. After delivering these keys, the $TA$ may erase the keys from his memory. Each sender keeps secret his encryption-key, and each receiver keeps secret his decryption-key. 

3. Encryption: For a plaintext $m \in M_k$, the sender $S_i$ generates a ciphertext $c = ENC(e_i, m, R_j) \in C_k$ which will be sent to the receiver $R_j$ by using his encryption-key $e_i$ in conjunction with the encryption algorithm $ENC$. 

4. Decryption: On receiving a ciphertext $c$ from a sender $S_i$, the receiver $R_j$ recovers a plaintext using his decryption-key $d_j$ and the decryption algorithm $DEC$. More precisely, if $DEC(d_j, c, S_i) = 1$, $R_j$ regards the received ciphertext $c$ as invalid. Otherwise, $R_j$ recovers the plaintext $m = DEC(d_j, c, S_i)$ as valid ciphertext from $S_i$. Here, we require that $DEC(d_j, ENC(e_i, m, R_j), S_i) = m$ for all $m \in M_k$.

The model of authenticated encryption is syntactically identical to that of encryption as defined above. The difference between encryption and authenticated encryption lies in their security goals: the goal of encryption is to achieve only confidentiality while the goal of authenticated encryption is to achieve both confidentiality and authenticity. In this paper, we use the model in Definition 1 even for authenticated encryption as well. In addition, we use encryption (resp. authenticated encryption) to emphasize cases that we are targeting confidentiality goals (resp. both confidentiality and authenticity goals).

Let $t_1$ and $t_2$ be the number up to which each sender is allowed to encrypt plaintexts and the number up to which each receiver is allowed to decrypt ciphertexts, respectively, and let $\omega$ be the number of possible colluders among users. Let $W = \{W \in \mathcal{U} \mid \#W \leq \omega\}$. Each element of $W$ represents a group of possibly collusive users. For a set $T$ and a non-negative integer $t$, let $\mathcal{P}(T, t) := \{T \subset T \mid \#T \leq t\}$ be the family of all subsets of $T$ whose cardinality are less than or equal to $t$.

**Definition 2**: (Exponentially Negligible Function) Let $\epsilon(k)$ be a function defined over the positive integers $k \in \mathbb{N}$ that takes non-negative real numbers. Then, $\epsilon(k)$ is called exponentially negligible if there exists an integer $k_0$ and some constant $\alpha(1 < \alpha)$ such that $\epsilon(k) \leq \frac{1}{\alpha^k}$ for all $k \geq k_0$.

We now consider security notions and formulate them along with our model in Definition 1 from information-theoretic viewpoints. In this paper, we consider the following security goals: for confidentiality, $APS$ (Almost Perfect Secrecy) and $NM$ (Non-Malleability); and for authenticity, $IntC$ (Integrity of Ciphertexts) and $IntP$ (Integrity of Plaintexts). The first notion of $APS$ is a straightforward relaxed notion of perfect secrecy by Shannon [17]. The second one, $NM$, will be formally defined in the context of unconditional security based on the idea of the notion of computational security [3, 4, 8, 9]. The third and fourth ones, $IntC$ and $IntP$, will be formally defined in the context of unconditional security setting based on the idea of that of computational security setting [4].

In addition, we consider the above four security goals under the most powerful attacking model, that is, chosen plaintext attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks (CPA and CCA) in unconditional security setting. Here, CPA and CCA means the attacks where the adversary can obtain the encryption of any plaintext of his choice and the decryption of any ciphertext of his choice except the target ciphertext.

First, we introduce the notion of almost perfect secrecy against chosen plaintext attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks (APS against CPA and CCA). Intuitively, the notion of APS means that the partial information on the plaintext from a target ciphertext which the adversary can derive is upper-bounded by a small quantity $\epsilon$. We note that this notion can capture the notion of perfect secrecy (PS) by considering the case that $\epsilon = 0$. We formalize APS from an information-theoretic viewpoint as follows.

**Definition 3** ($(A)PS$ against CPA and CCA (cf. [17])): Let $\Pi$ be an encryption or authenticated encryption scheme. Let $k$ be a security parameter. For $W \in \mathcal{W}$ such that $S_i, R_j \notin W$, we define

$$P_{\Pi}^{APS}(S_i, R_j, W) := \max_{e_w} \max_{M_{s_i}} \max_{C_{s_j}} \max_{M_{s_1}, \ldots, M_{s_i}, \ldots, M_{s_k}} \max_{C_{s_2}, \ldots, C_{s_i}, \ldots, C_{s_n}} \{\Pr(m|c, e_w, W) \mid \{M_{s_1} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_{R_i} | 1 \leq s \leq n_2\} - \Pr(m)\},$$

where $e_w$ is taken over all possible combination of keys of $W$; $M_{s_j}$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(M_k \times C_k, t_1 - 1)$ such that any element $(m_{s_1}, c_{s_2})$ of $M_{s_j}$ is a pair of a plaintext $m_{s_1}$ and a corresponding ciphertext $c_{s_2}$, encrypted by $S_i$; $M_{s_j}(l \neq i)$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(M_k \times C_k, t_1)$ such that any element $(m_{s_1}, c_{s_2})$ of $M_{s_j}$ is a pair of a plaintext $m_{s_1}$ and a corresponding ciphertext $c_{s_2}$, encrypted by $S_i$; $C_{R_j}$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(C_k \times (M_k \cup \{\bot\}), t_2)$ such that any element of $C_{R_j}$ is a pair of a ciphertext $c_{R_j}$ and a decryption result of $c_{R_j}$ by $R_j$; $C_{R_j}(s \neq j)$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(C_k \times (M_k \cup \{\bot\}), t_2)$ such that any element of $C_{R_j}$ is a pair of a ciphertext $c_{R_j}$ and a decryption result of $c_{R_j}$ by $R_j$; and $c$ is taken over valid ciphertexts from $S_i$ to $R_j$ such that $c$ does not appear in $C_{R_j}$.

We define

$$P_{\Pi}^{APS} := \max_{S_i, R_j, W} P_{\Pi}^{APS}(S_i, R_j, W).$$

Then, the scheme $\Pi$ is said to be $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS (Almost Per-
fectly Secure) if $P_{\Pi}^{\text{PS}} \leq \epsilon$ for some exponentially negligible function $\epsilon$. In particular, if $P_{\Pi}^{\text{PS}} = 0$, the scheme $\Pi$ is said to be $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-PS (Perfectly Secure).

**Remark 1:** The above notion of APS is defined only in terms of probability distribution since we are discussing information-theoretic security. On the other hand, we note that in the public-key setting the notion of semantic security [10] is known as a computational analogue of Shannon’s definition of perfect secrecy [17]. And, in order to define semantic security or equivalently indistinguishability [10], the computational complexity-theoretic approach by using computational models whose computational complexity is polynomially bounded is taken rather than the information-theoretic one by the use of probability distribution.

**Remark 2:** In Definition 3, we have considered the attacking model of CPA and CCA. In the public-key setting, for each of CPA and CCA adaptive and non-adaptive cases are currently known. However, there is no difference between them in Definition 3. This is because all possible information which the adversary with unlimited computational power can obtain by having access to both encryption and decryption oracles is taken into account. The same can also be applied to other security definitions in this paper. Thus, in the sequel we do not consider adaptive and non-adaptive cases separately in formalizing CPA and CCA, since there is no difference between them in formalization.

We next formally define the notion of non-malleability in unconditional security setting based on the idea of that of non-malleability in computational setting [3],[8],[9]. Intuitively, the notion of non-malleability means that from a ciphertext $c$ it is difficult for the adversary to create a ciphertext $c'$ such that underlying plaintexts of them are meaningfully related. While the notion of non-malleability in [3],[8],[9] is considered from a computational complexity-theoretic point of view, we formulate this notion by the use of probability distribution in the following since we are discussing information-theoretic security.

**Definition 4** (NM against CPA and CCA): Let $\Pi$ be an encryption or authenticated encryption scheme. Let $k$ be a security parameter and $\epsilon(k)$ an exponentially negligible function. For simplicity, we denote the exponentially negligible function $\epsilon(k)$ by $\epsilon$. For a relation $R$ on $M_k$, we write $R(x_1, x_2) = 1$ if the relation $R$ holds for $x_1, x_2 \in M_k$, and we write $R(x_1, x_2) = 0$ otherwise. For any relation $R$ on $M_k$, we extend $R$ to the relation $\tilde{R}$ on $M_k \cup \{\perp\}$ as follows:

$$\tilde{R}(x_1, x_2) := \begin{cases} R(x_1, x_2) & \text{if } x_1, x_2 \in M_k \\ 0 & \text{if } x_1 = \perp \text{ or } x_2 = \perp \end{cases}$$

For $W \in W$ such that $S_i, R_j \not\in W$ and a relation $R$ on $M_k$, we define

$$P_{\Pi}^{\text{NM}}(R; S_i, R_j, W) := \max_{e_w} \max_{M_{S_i}} \max_{C_{R_j}} \max_{M_{S_2}, \ldots, M_{S_{l_1}}(\neq i)} \max_{C_{R_1}, \ldots, C_{R_{l_2}}(\neq j)} \max_{e_w, M_{S_j}} \left[ \Pr(d) \cdot \chi_{\text{NM}}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; \text{DEC}(d, c, S_j), \text{DEC}(d, c', S_j)) \right]$$

where $e_w$ is taken over all combinations of keys of $W$; $M_{S_j}$ is taken over $P(M \times C, t_j - 1)$ such that any element $(m_{S_j}, c_{S_j})$ of $M_{S_j}$ is a pair of a plaintext $m_{S_j}$ and a corresponding ciphertext $c_{S_j}$ encrypted by $S_j$; $C_{R_j}$ is taken over $P(C \times (M \cup \{\perp\}), t_j - 1)$ such that any element of $C_{R_j}$ is a pair of a ciphertext $c_{R_j}$, and a decryption result of $c_{R_j}$ by $R_j$; $C_{R_j}$ is taken over $P(C \times (M \cup \{\perp\}), t_j - 1)$ such that any element of $C_{R_j}$ is a pair of a ciphertext $c_{R_j}$ and a decryption result of $c_{R_j}$ by $R_j$; $c$ is taken over valid ciphertexts from $S_j$ to $R_j$; $c'$ is taken over ciphertexts from $S_j$ to $R_j$ such that $c' \neq c$; and the function $\chi_{\text{NM}}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; m, \text{DEC}(d, c', S_j))$ is defined as follows. For $m \in M_k$, $c' \in C_k$ and $R_j$’s decryption key $d \in D_k$.

$$\chi_{\text{NM}}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; m, \text{DEC}(d, c', S_j)) := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \tilde{R}(m, \text{DEC}(d, c', S_j)) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Similarly, the function $\chi_{\text{NM}}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; \text{DEC}(d, c, S_j), \text{DEC}(d, c', S_j))$ is defined as follows. For the given $(c, e_w, |M_{S_j}| |l \leq l \leq n_1|, |C_{R_j}| |l \leq l \leq n_2|)$ and $d \in D_k$, $c' \in C_k$ with $c' \neq c$,

$$\chi_{\text{NM}}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; \text{DEC}(d, c, S_j), \text{DEC}(d, c', S_j)) := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if the given (c, e_w, |M_{S_j}| |l \leq l \leq n_1|, |C_{R_j}| |l \leq l \leq n_2|) can occur with positive probability and } \tilde{R}(\text{DEC}(d, c, S_j), \text{DEC}(d, c', S_j)) = 1 \text{ for } R_j’\text{’s decryption key } d \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We define

$$P_{\Pi}^{\text{NM}}(R) := \max_{S_i, R_j} P_{\Pi}^{\text{NM}}(R; S_i, R_j, W).$$

Then, the scheme $\Pi$ is said to be $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM (Non-Malleable) if $P_{\Pi}^{\text{NM}}(R) \leq \epsilon$ for any relation $R$.

For confidentiality, we have already introduced the notions of almost perfect secrecy and non-malleability in the unconditional setting. In addition to the notions of confidentiality, we formally define two notions of the integrity, IntC (Integrity of Ciphertexts) and IntP (Integrity of Plaintexts), for authenticated encryption in the unconditional setting. The notion of IntC prevents the adversary from illegitimately producing a ciphertext which the sender has not
previously created, while the notion of IntP prevents the adversary from illegitimately producing a ciphertext decrypting to a plaintext which the sender had never encrypted.

We first consider IntC. Intuitively, the notion of IntC means that it is difficult for the adversary to create a ciphertext $c$ that has not been previously created by the sender but will be accepted as valid and authentic by the receiver. This notion is formalized in [4] in the context of symmetric encryption in terms of computational security. We note that the notion of IntC along with the model of symmetric encryption is also formalized in [5] and [14].

In the following, we formulate the notion of IntC along with our model only by the use of probability distribution since we are discussing information-theoretic security along with our model.

**Definition 5 (IntC against CPA and CCA):** Let $\Pi$ be an authenticated encryption scheme. Let $k$ be a security parameter and $\epsilon$ an exponentially negligible function. For $W \in W$ such that $S_i, R_j \notin W$, we define $\rho^{\text{IntC}}_{\Pi}(S_i, R_j, W) := \max_{M_s, c_s} \max_{R_j} \Pr(R_j \text{ decrypts } c \text{ from } S_i \text{ as not } \perp | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\})$, where $e_W$ is taken over all possible combination of keys of $W$; $M_s$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{M}_s \times C_s, t_i)$ such that any element $(m_{s_i}, c_{s_i})$ of $MS_i$ is a pair of plaintext $m_{s_i}$ and a corresponding ciphertext $c_{s_i}$ encrypted by $S_i$; $M_s, (l \neq i)$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{M}_s \times C_s, t_i)$ such that any element $(m_{s_j}, c_{s_j})$ of $MS_j$ is a pair of a plaintext $m_{s_j}$, and a corresponding ciphertext $c_{s_j}$, encrypted by $S_j$; $C_R$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(C_R \times (M_s \cup \{\perp\}), t_2 - 1)$ such that any element of $C_R$ is a pair of a ciphertext $c_{R_i}$ and a decryption result of $c_{R_i}$ by $R_j$; $C_R(s \neq j)$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{C}_R \times (M_s \cup \{\perp\}), t_2)$ such that any element of $C_R$ is a pair of a ciphertext $c_{R_j}$ and a decryption result of $c_{R_j}$ by $R_j$; $c$ is taken over ciphertexts such that $c$ does not appear in $M_s$, and also not in $C_R$, except (c, $\perp$); and for given $(e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\})$, the probability $\Pr(R_j \text{ decrypts } c \text{ from } S_i \text{ as not } \perp | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\})$ is strictly defined as follows. For the given $(e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\})$,

$$\Pr(R_j \text{ decrypts } c \text{ from } S_i \text{ as not } \perp | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}) := \sum_{d \in \mathcal{D}_j} \mathcal{P}(d) \cdot \chi^{\text{IntC}}(S_i, R_j; c, d | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}, \chi^{\text{IntC}}(S_i, R_j; c, d | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}))$$

We define $\rho^{\text{IntP}}_{\Pi}(S_i, R_j, W) := \max_{M_s, c_s} \max_{R_j} \Pr(R_j \text{ decrypts } c \text{ from } S_i \text{ as not } \perp, \text{ and not in } M_s | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\})$, where $e_W$ is taken over all possible combination of keys of $W$; $M_s$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{M}_s \times C_s, t_i)$ such that any element $(m_{s_i}, c_{s_i})$ of $MS_i$ is a pair of plaintext $m_{s_i}$ and a corresponding ciphertext $c_{s_i}$ encrypted by $S_i$; $M_s, (l \neq i)$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{M}_s \times C_s, t_i)$ such that any element $(m_{s_j}, c_{s_j})$ of $MS_j$ is a pair of a plaintext $m_{s_j}$, and a corresponding ciphertext $c_{s_j}$, encrypted by $S_j$; $C_R$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(C_R \times (M_s \cup \{\perp\}), t_2 - 1)$ such that any element of $C_R$ is a pair of a ciphertext $c_{R_i}$ and a decryption result of $c_{R_i}$ by $R_j$; $C_R(s \neq j)$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{C}_R \times (M_s \cup \{\perp\}), t_2)$ such that any element of $C_R$ is a pair of a ciphertext $c_{R_j}$ and a decryption result of $c_{R_j}$ by $R_j$; $c$ is taken over ciphertexts such that $c$ does not appear in $M_s$, and also not in $C_R$; and for given $(e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\})$, the probability $\Pr(R_j \text{ decrypts } c \text{ from } S_i \text{ as not } \perp, \text{ and not in } M_s | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\})$ is strictly defined as follows. For the given $(e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\})$,

$$\Pr(R_j \text{ decrypts } c \text{ from } S_i \text{ as not } \perp, \text{ and not in } M_s | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}) := \sum_{d \in \mathcal{D}_j} \mathcal{P}(d) \cdot \chi^{\text{IntP}}(S_i, R_j; c, d | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}, \chi^{\text{IntP}}(S_i, R_j; c, d | e_W, \{M_s|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}))$$
tacks. In the sequel, we briefly call this notion of signing-keys. Here, polynomial of $k$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible signers and $S_n$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible users, $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-Intp if $P_{\text{Intp}}^{\Pi} \leq \epsilon$.

2.2 A Model of Signature Schemes with Unconditional Security

In this subsection, we consider a model of unconditionally secure signature schemes and describe the security definition considered in [18].

**Definition 7 (Signature [12] [18]):** A signature scheme $\Lambda$ consists of $(\mathcal{U}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{VK}, \Pi, \mathcal{GEN}, \mathcal{SIG}, \mathcal{VER})$:

- $\mathcal{U} = \{S_1, \ldots, S_n, V_1, \ldots, V_n\}$ is a finite set of users, where $S_i$ are signers and $V_j$ are verifiers. Let $\mathcal{U}_k := \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n\}$ and $\mathcal{U}_v := \{V_1, V_2, \ldots, V_n\}$. We also use $S_i$ (resp. $V_j$) as $S_i$’s (resp. $V_j$’s) identity.
- $\Pi$ is a trusted authority.
- $\mathcal{M} = \{M_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible messages, where $M_k \subset \{0, 1\}^{\lambda k(k)}$, and $l_M(k)$ is a polynomial of $k$. Hereafter, $k$ means a security parameter.
- $\mathcal{SK} = \{SK_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible signing-keys. Here, $SK_k \subset \{0, 1\}^{\lambda k(k)}$, and $l_{SK}(k)$ is a polynomial of $k$.
- $\mathcal{VK} = \{VK_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a sequence of finite sets of possible verification-keys. Here, $VK_k \subset \{0, 1\}^{\lambda k(k)}$, and $l_{VK}(k)$ is a polynomial of $k$.
- $\mathcal{GEN}$ is a key generation algorithm which on input a security parameter $\lambda$, outputs signing-keys and verification-keys.
- $\mathcal{SIG} : SK \times M \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ is a signing algorithm.
- $\mathcal{VER} : VK \times M \times A \times U_k \rightarrow \{true, false\}$ is a verification algorithm.

As in the previous subsection, let $t_1$ and $t_2$ be the number up to which each signer is allowed to sign messages and the number up to which each verifier is allowed to verify signatures, respectively, and let $\omega$ be the number of possible colluders among users.

In [18], it is mentioned that the strong security of the signature schemes with unconditional security is existential unforgeability for any verifier against adaptive chosen message attacks and adaptive chosen signature attacks. In the sequel, we briefly call this notion $\text{EAF against ACMA and ACSA}$. On the other hand, the notion of existential unforgeability (EUF), which is currently considered as the strong security notion in public-key signature schemes [11], can also be considered in the unconditional security setting. However, we note that as shown in [18] it is sufficient to consider $\text{EAF against ACMA and ACSA}$ as strong security, since $\text{EAF against ACMA and ACSA}$ always implies $\text{EUF against ACMA and ACSA}$.

Intuitively, the notion of $\text{EAF}$ means that it is difficult for the adversary to create a signature that has not been legally created by the signer but will be accepted as valid by a verifier. Here, note that in the unconditional security setting there may exist a signature which cannot be output by the signing algorithm with a legitimate signing key but will be accepted by the verification algorithm with a legitimate verification key (See [18]). In the following, we describe the formalization of the notion of $\text{EAF against CMA and CSA}$ along with our model by the use of probability distribution as in [18]. Here, note that the notion of CMA and CSA is sufficient to consider since there is no difference between adaptive and non-adaptive cases in the following formalization (See also Remark 2).

**Definition 8 (EAF against CMA and CSA [18]):** Let $\Lambda$ be a signature scheme. Let $k$ be a security parameter and $\epsilon(k)$ an exponentially negligible function.

1) For $W \in \mathcal{W}$ such that $S_i, V_j \notin \mathcal{W}$, we define

$$P_{\Lambda, k}^{\text{EAF}}(S_i, V_j, W) := \max_{e_{W, V}, M_{S_i}} \max_{e_{W, V}, M_{V_j}} \max_{M_{S_1}, \ldots, M_{S_n}, \ldots, M_{S_1}, \ldots, M_{S_n}} \max_{M_{V_1}, \ldots, M_{V_n}, \ldots, M_{V_1}, \ldots, M_{V_n}} \max_{(m, a)} \Pr(V_j, \text{accepts} (m, a) \text{ as signed by } S_i | e_{W, M_{S_i}} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, | M_{V_j}, | 1 \leq s \leq n_2)$$

where $e_{W, V}$ is taken over all possible combination of keys of $W$; $M_S$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}_k \times \mathcal{A}_k, t_1)$ such that any element of $M_S$ is a valid signed message generated by $S_i$; $M_{V_j}(l \neq j)$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}_k \times \mathcal{A}_k, t_1)$ such that any element of $M_{V_j}$ is a valid signed message generated by $S_j$; $M_{V_j}$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}_k \times \mathcal{A}_k \times \{true, false\}, t_1)$ such that any element of $M_{V_j}$ is a signed message $(m_{V_j}, a_{V_j})$ and a verification result of $(m_{V_j}, a_{V_j})$ by $V_j$; $M_{V_j}(s \neq j)$ is taken over $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}_k \times \mathcal{A}_k \times \{true, false\}, t_1)$ such that any element of $M_{V_j}$ is a signed message $(m_{V_j}, a_{V_j})$ and a verification result of $(m_{V_j}, a_{V_j})$ by $V_j$; $(m, a)$ is taken over $\mathcal{M}_k \times \mathcal{A}_k$ such that $(m, a) \notin M_S$, and does not appear in $M_{V_j}$ except $(m, a)$; $false$; and for given $(e_{W, M_{S_i}} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, | M_{V_j}, | 1 \leq s \leq n_2)$, the probability $Pr(V_j, \text{accepts} (m, a) \text{ as signed by } S_i | e_{W, M_{S_i}} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, | M_{V_j}, | 1 \leq s \leq n_2)$ is strictly defined as follows. For the given $(e_{W, M_{S_i}} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, | M_{V_j}, | 1 \leq s \leq n_2)$ and $V_j$’s verification-key $\omega \in \mathcal{VK}_{k_1}$

$$\Pr(V_j, \text{accepts} (m, a) \text{ as signed by } S_i | e_{W, M_{S_i}} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, | M_{V_j}, | 1 \leq s \leq n_2)) := \sum_{v \in \mathcal{VK}_{k_1}} \Pr(v) \cdot \chi_{\text{EAF}, \Lambda}(S_i, V_j; (m, a), v | e_{W, M_{S_i}})$$
2) For $W$ such that $V_j \notin W$ and $S_i \in W$, we define $p_{EAF}^{EAF}(S_i, V_j, W)$ as

$$p_{EAF}^{EAF}(S_i, V_j, W) := \max_{eW} \max_{M_{V_j}} \max_{\Lambda} \Pr(V_j \text{ accepts } (m, a) \text{ as signed by } S_i | eW, [M_{V_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, l \neq i], [M_V | 1 \leq s \leq n_2])$$

where $eW$ is taken over all possible combinations of keys of $W; M_{V_j}(l \neq i)$ is taken over $P(M \times \mathcal{A}_n, t_1)$ such that any element of $M_{V_j}$ is a valid signed message generated by $S_i; M_V$ is taken over $P(M \times \mathcal{A}_n \times \{true, false\}, t_2 - 1)$ such that any element of $M_V$ is a pair of a signed message $(m, \alpha)$ and a verification result of $(m, \alpha)$ by $V_j; M_{V_j}(s \neq j)$ is taken over $P(M \times \mathcal{A}_n \times \{true, false\}, t_2)$ such that any element of $M_{V_j}$ is a pair of a signed message $(m, \alpha)$ and a verification result of $(m, \alpha)$ by $V_j; (m, a)$ is taken over invalid signed messages such that $(m, a)$ does not appear in $M_{V_j}$ except $(m, a, false)$; and for given $(eW, [M_{V_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, l \neq i], [M_V | 1 \leq s \leq n_2])$, the probability $Pr(V_j \text{ accepts } (m, a) \text{ as signed by } S_i | eW, [M_{V_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, l \neq i], [M_V | 1 \leq s \leq n_2])$ is strictly defined as follows. For the given $(eW, [M_{V_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, l \neq i], [M_V | 1 \leq s \leq n_2])$ and $V_j$'s verification-key $v \in \mathcal{VK}_k$,

$\Pr(V_j \text{ accepts } (m, a) \text{ as signed by } S_i | eW, [M_{V_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, l \neq i], [M_V | 1 \leq s \leq n_2]) := \sum_{v \in \mathcal{VK}_k} \Pr(v) \cdot \chi_{EAF_2}(S_i, V_j; (m, a), v | eW, [M_{V_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1, l \neq i], [M_V | 1 \leq s \leq n_2]),$

Then, the signature scheme $\Lambda$ is said to be $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-EAF if $\max(p_{EAF}^{EAF}, p_{EAF}^{EAF}) \leq \epsilon$. 

3. Relations among Security Notions for Authenticated Encryption

In the previous section, we define the notions of $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS and $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM for confidentiality, and those of $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntC and $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntP for authenticity. Thus, by combining these notions of confidentiality and authenticity, we reach the following four notions for authenticated encryption schemes:

(i) $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS and $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntC, which is briefly denoted by $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS $\wedge$ IntC;
(ii) $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS and $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntP, which is briefly denoted by $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS $\wedge$ IntP;
(iii) $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM and $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntC, which is briefly denoted by $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM $\wedge$ IntC; and
(iv) $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM and $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntP, which is briefly denoted by $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM $\wedge$ IntP.

In this section, we analyze relations among the security notions and reveal the strongest notion among them. First, we start with the following proposition. The proof of Proposition 1 easily follows from the definitions.

**Proposition 1:** Let $\Pi$ be an authenticated encryption scheme. Let $X \in \{APS, NM, IntC, IntP\}$. If $\Pi$ is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-X, then $\Pi$ is $(\omega', t_1', t_2')$-X for $\omega \geq \omega', t_1 \geq t_1'$ and $t_2 \geq t_2'$.

Next, for authenticity, we show that the notion of IntC always implies that of IntP.

**Theorem 1:** Let $\Pi$ be an authenticated encryption scheme. If $\Pi$ is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntC, then $\Pi$ is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntP.

**Proof.** We use same notations used in Definitions 5 and 6. For any $eW, [M_{V_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1], [C_R | 1 \leq s \leq n_2]$ and $c$, we have

$$\Pr(R_j \text{ decrypts } c \text{ from } S_i \text{ as not } \bot \text{ and not } \text{ in } M_{S_j}[eW, [M_{V_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1], [C_R | 1 \leq s \leq n_2]) \leq \Pr(R_j \text{ decrypts } c \text{ from } S_i \text{ as not } \bot | eW, [M_{S_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1], [C_R | 1 \leq s \leq n_2]).$$

Thus, $P_{\Pi}^{\text{IntP}}(S_i, R_j, W) \leq P_{\Pi}^{\text{IntC}}(S_i, R_j, W)$ for any $S_i, R_j$ and $W$. Therefore, we obtain $P_{\Pi}^{\text{IntP}} \leq P_{\Pi}^{\text{IntC}}$. This implies that if $P_{\Pi}^{\text{IntC}} \leq \epsilon$, it follows that $P_{\Pi}^{\text{IntP}} \leq \epsilon$.

From Theorem 1 it is sufficient to consider (i) or (iii), when we are interested in the strongest security notion among the four notions (i)–(iv). The following theorems (Theorems 2 and 3) show that the strongest notion among them is exactly (i).

**Theorem 2:** Let $\Pi$ be an authenticated encryption scheme. If $\Pi$ is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS $\wedge$ IntC, then $\Pi$ is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM $\wedge$ IntC.

**Proof.** Since $\Pi$ is already $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntC, it is sufficient to show that it is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM. Suppose that $P_{\Pi}^{\text{IntC}} \leq \epsilon$. Let $d$ be a decryption key of the receiver $R_j$. Also, let $(eW, [M_{S_j} | 1 \leq l \leq n_1], [C_R | 1 \leq s \leq n_2], c, c')$ be arbitrarily given
and suppose that it can occur with positive probability. Then, if $\chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; DEC(d, c, S_i)) = 1$, we have $DEC(d, c', S_i) \neq \perp$. Therefore,

$$
\chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; DEC(d, c, S_i)) \leq \chi_{INC}(S_i, R_j; d, c', \{c, w, \{M_S|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}\})
$$

In the other hand, we note that for $m \in M_k$, $\chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; m, DEC(d, c', S_i)) = 1$ implies $DEC(d, c', S_i) \neq \perp$. Therefore,

$$
\chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; m, DEC(d, c', S_i)) \leq \chi_{INC}(S_i, R_j; d, c').
$$

Thus, we obtain

$$
\sum_{m \in M_k} \Pr(m)\chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; m, DEC(d, c', S_i)) \leq \sum_{m \in M_k} \Pr(m)\chi_{INC}(S_i, R_j; d, c') = \chi_{INC}(S_i, R_j; d, c').
$$

By (1) and (2), it is shown that

$$
\sum_{d \in \mathcal{D}_d} \Pr(d) \cdot \chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; DEC(d, c, S_i),\{c, w, \{M_S|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}\}) \leq \sum_{m \in M_k} \Pr(m)\chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; m, DEC(d, c', S_i)) \leq \max(\chi_{INC}(S_i, R_j; d, c'), \chi_{INC}(S_i, R_j; d, c') + \chi_{INC}(S_i, R_j; d, c'| c, w, \{M_S|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}))
$$

From (3) it follows that

$$
\sum_{d \in \mathcal{D}_d} \Pr(d) \cdot \chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; DEC(d, c, S_i),\{c, w, \{M_S|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}\}) \leq \sum_{m \in M_k} \Pr(m)\chi_{NM}(\tilde{R}; S_i, R_j; m, DEC(d, c', S_i)) \leq 2\Pi_{INC}\perp
$$

where the last inequality follows from the definition of $\Pi_{INC}$. By taking maximum for $w, \{M_S|1 \leq l \leq n_1\}, \{C_R|1 \leq s \leq n_2\}$, $c$ and $c'$, it follows that

$$
P_{\Pi_{INC}}(\mathbb{R}; S_i, R_j, W) \leq 2\Pi_{INC}\perp.
$$

Therefore, $P_{\Pi_{INC}}(\mathbb{R}) \leq 2\Pi_{INC}\perp$ for any relation $\mathbb{R}$. This implies that $P_{\Pi_{INC}}(\mathbb{R}) \leq 2\varepsilon$ for any relation $\mathbb{R}$, since $P_{\Pi_{INC}} \leq \varepsilon$.

**Theorem 3:** There exists a scheme which is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM and IntC but is not $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS and IntC.

**Proof.** Let $\Lambda$ be a signature scheme which meets $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-EUA. Then, by the definitions of $P_{INC}$ and $P_{EUA}$, it easily follows that $P_{\Pi_{INC}} \leq P_{EUA}$. Thus, $P_{\Pi_{INC}} \leq P_{EUA} \leq \varepsilon$, which means that $\Lambda$ is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntC. Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 2, it follows that the scheme $\Lambda$ meets $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM. Thus, it is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-NM and IntC. On the other hand, the scheme $\Lambda$ does not obviously meet $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS. □

It should be noted that the strongest security notion for authenticated encryption is clearly the combined notion $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS and NM and IntC and APS, that is, the one which includes all the notions for confidentiality and authenticity. However, from the above relations among the notions, we can simply define the strongest security notion for authenticated encryption in unconditional setting as follows:

**Definition 9** (Strong Security): Let $\Pi$ be an authenticated encryption. Then, $\Pi$ is said to be $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-secure if $\Pi$ meets both $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS and $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-IntC.

### 4. Analysis of Generic Composition Methods in Unconditional Setting

#### 4.1 Generic Composition Methods

Let $\Pi$ be an encryption scheme specified by an encryption algorithm $ENC_{\Pi}$ and a decryption algorithm $DEC_{\Pi}$. Let $\Lambda$ be a signature scheme specified by a signing algorithm $SIG_{\Lambda}$ and a verification algorithm $VER_{\Lambda}$. We define typical three types of composition methods to construct an authenticated encryption $\Pi$ based on $\Pi$ and $\Lambda$ in the sequel. Consider the case that a sender $S_i$ generates a ciphertext $\tilde{c}$ of a plaintext $m$ and then sends it to a receiver $R_j$ in our model in Sect. 2. Here, let $e$ and $s$ be $S_i$’s encryption key in $\Pi$ and $S_i$’s signing key in $\Lambda$, respectively. Also, let $d$ and $v$ be $R_j$’s decryption key in $\Pi$ and $R_j$’s verification key in $\Lambda$, respectively. Then, $S_i$’s encryption key in $\Pi$ is $\tilde{e} := (e, s)$, and $R_j$’s decryption key in $\Pi$ is $\tilde{d} := (d, v)$. The three typical types of composition methods, denoted by $Encrypt$-and-$Sign$, $Sign$-then-$Encrypt$, and $Encrypt$-then-$Sign$, are defined as follows:

- **Encrypt-and-Sign**: $\tilde{c} = ENC_{\Pi}(\tilde{e}, m, R_j) = (c, a)$, where $c = ENC_{\Pi}(e, m, R_j)$ and $a = SIG_{\Lambda}(s, m)$. $DEC_{\Pi}$ is performed by first performing $DEC_{\Pi}$ to recover $m$ and then verifying the signature $a$. If $DEC_{\Pi}$ outputs $\perp$ or $VER_{\Lambda}$ outputs false, $DEC_{\Pi}$ outputs $\perp$ implying that the ciphertext is invalid.

- **Sign-then-Encrypt**: $\tilde{c} = DEC_{\Pi}(\tilde{e}, m, R_j) = ENC_{\Pi}(c, (m, a), R_j)$, where $a = SIG_{\Lambda}(s, m)$. $DEC_{\Pi}$ is performed by first performing $DEC_{\Pi}$ to recover $(m, a)$ and then verifying the signature $a$. If $DEC_{\Pi}$ outputs $\perp$ or $VER_{\Lambda}$ outputs false, $DEC_{\Pi}$ outputs $\perp$ implying that the ciphertext is invalid.

- **Encrypt-then-Sign**: $\tilde{c} = ENC_{\Pi}(\tilde{e}, m, R_j) = DEC_{\Pi}(c, (m, a), R_j)$, where $a = SIG_{\Lambda}(s, m)$. $DEC_{\Pi}$ is performed by first performing $DEC_{\Pi}$ to recover $m$ and then verifying the signature $a$. If $DEC_{\Pi}$ outputs $\perp$ or $VER_{\Lambda}$ outputs false, $DEC_{\Pi}$ outputs $\perp$ implying that the ciphertext is invalid.
Otherwise, \( \Lambda \) is not (\( \omega, t_2 \))-APS if \( \Pi \) is (\( \omega, t_2 \))-APS. Then, however, \( \Pi \) formed by the Encrypt-and-Sign composition method based on \( \Pi' \) and \( \Lambda \),

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ENC}_{\Pi'}(\bar{e}, m, R_j) &= (\text{ENC}_{\Pi}(e, m, R_j), \text{SIG}_{\Lambda}(s, m)) \\
&= (\text{ENC}_{\Pi}(e, m, R_j), m||\text{SIG}_{\Lambda}(s, m)).
\end{align*}
\]

Let \((r||c, a)\) be a ciphertext generated by the sender \( S_j \). Then, \( \text{DEC}_{\Pi'}(d, (r'||c, a), S_i) \neq \perp \), where \( r' = 1 \) if \( r = 0 \) and \( r' = 0 \) if \( r = 1 \). Thus, \( \bar{\Pi} \) is not (\( \omega, t_2 \))-IntC. \( \square \)

### 4.3 Sign-then-Encrypt

The following theorem shows that the Sign-then-Encrypt composition method is always secure if the given encryption meets APS and the given signature meets EAUF.

**Theorem 6:** Given an encryption scheme \( \Pi \) which meets (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-APS and a signature scheme \( \Lambda \) which meets (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-EAUF, there exists an encryption scheme \( \Pi' \) such that \( \Pi' \) meets (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-APS, but the scheme \( \Pi' \) formed by the Sign-then-Encrypt composition method based on \( \Pi' \) and \( \Lambda \) is neither (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-APS nor (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-IntC.

**Proof.** Let \( \Pi = (\text{GEN}_{\Pi}, \text{ENC}_{\Pi}, \text{DEC}_{\Pi}) \) be the given encryption scheme and \( \Lambda = (\text{GEN}_{\Lambda}, \text{SIG}_{\Lambda}, \text{VER}_{\Lambda}) \) the given signature scheme. We construct an encryption scheme \( \Pi' = (\text{GEN}_{\Pi'}, \text{SIG}_{\Pi'}, \text{VER}_{\Pi'}) \) as follows: (i) \( \text{GEN}_{\Pi'} = \text{GEN}_{\Pi} \); (ii) \( \text{SIG}_{\Pi'} : \) for a message \( m \), \( \text{SIG}_{\Pi'}(s, m) := m||\text{SIG}_{\Lambda}(s, m) \). Consequently, the signed message is \((m, \text{SIG}_{\Pi'}(s, m))\); and (iii) \( \text{VER}_{\Pi'} : \) for a signed message \((m, a)\), parse \( a \) as \( a_1||a_2 \) where \( |a_1| = |m| \). If \( m = a_1 \) and \( \text{VER}_{\Lambda}(v, (m, a_2), S_i) = \text{true} \), \( \text{VER}_{\Pi'}(v, (m, a), S_i) = \text{true} \). Otherwise, \( \text{VER}_{\Pi'}(v, (m, a), S_i) = \text{false} \). Then, it is shown that \( \Pi' \) is (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-EAUF if \( \Lambda \) is (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-EAUF. However, in \( \bar{\Pi} \) which is formed by the Encrypt-and-Sign composition method based on \( \Pi \) and \( \Lambda \),

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ENC}_{\Pi'}(\bar{e}, m, R_j) &= (\text{ENC}_{\Pi}(e, m, R_j), \text{SIG}_{\Pi'}(s, m)) \\
&= (\text{ENC}_{\Pi}(e, m, R_j), m||\text{SIG}_{\Lambda}(s, m)).
\end{align*}
\]

Obviously, \( \bar{\Pi} \) is not (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-APS. \( \square \)

### 4.4 Encrypt-then-Sign

The following theorem shows that the Encrypt-then-Sign composition method is always secure if the given encryption meets APS and the given signature meets EAUF.

**Theorem 7:** Given an encryption scheme \( \Pi \) which meets (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-APS, and a signature scheme \( \Lambda \) which meets (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-咿 защитный, then the scheme \( \Pi \) formed by the Encrypt-then-Sign composition method based on \( \Pi \) and \( \Lambda \) meet both (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-APS and (\( \omega, t_1, t_2 \))-IntC.
Proof. Let $\Pi = (GEN_{\Pi}, ENC_{\Pi}, DEC_{\Pi})$ be the given encryption scheme and $\Lambda = (GEN_{\Lambda}, SIG_{\Lambda}, VER_{\Lambda})$ the given signature scheme.

$ENC_{\Pi}(\tilde{e}, m, R_j) = (c, a)$,

c where $c = ENC_{\Pi}(e, m, R_j)$ and $a = SIG_{\Lambda}(s, c)$. Since $\Pi$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-APS and $\Lambda$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-EAUF, without loss of generality we can assume that $P_{PS \Lambda}^{ENC} \leq \epsilon$ and $P_{PS \Lambda}^{ENC} \leq \epsilon$, where $P_{PS \Lambda}^{ENC} := \max\{P_{PS \Lambda}^{ENC}, P_{PS \Lambda}^{VER}, P_{PS \Lambda}^{VER}\}$.

First, by the definitions of $P_{PS \Lambda}^{ENC}$ and $P_{PS \Lambda}^{VER}$, it easily follows that $P_{PS \Lambda}^{ENC} \leq P_{PS \Lambda}^{VER}$. Thus, $P_{PS \Lambda}^{ENC} \leq \epsilon$ if $P_{PS \Lambda}^{VER} \leq \epsilon$, which implies that $\tilde{\Pi}$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-IntC if $\Lambda$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-EAUF.

Secondly, we will show that $\tilde{\Pi}$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-APS if $\Pi$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-APS and $\Lambda$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-EAUF. Before providing a formal proof, we briefly explain the proof idea.

Let $(c, a)$ be a target ciphertext in $\tilde{\Pi}$. The ciphertext which is different from $(c, a)$ has the form $(c', a')$ with $c' \neq c$, or $(c, a')$ with $a' \neq a$. Even if the adversary asks the receiver $R_j$, regarding him as a decryption-oracle, the query of the form $(c', a')$ with $c' \neq c$, the adversary cannot obtain any partial information on the plaintext underlying $c$ since $\Pi$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-APS. On the other hand, even if the adversary asks the receiver $R_j$, regarding him as a decryption-oracle, the query of the form $(c, a')$ with $a' \neq a$, the adversary cannot obtain the meaningful answer since $\Lambda$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-EAUF. Thus, the queries of this form cannot help him to derive any partial information on the plaintext underlying $c$. Therefore, the adversary cannot eventually obtain any partial information on the plaintext underlying $c$, even if he adaptively asks queries.

Now, we show the formal proof that $\tilde{\Pi}$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-APS if $\Pi$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-APS and $\Lambda$ is $(\omega_1, \omega_2)$-EAUF. We note that $P_{PS \Pi}^{ENC}(S, R_j, W)$ is defined as follows.

$$P_{PS \Pi}^{ENC}(S, R_j, W) := \max_{e \in E} \max_{m \in M} \max_{\tilde{e}_i \in \tilde{E}} \max_{\tilde{\Pi} \in \tilde{\Pi}} \left\{ \Pr(m \tilde{c} = (c, a), e, \tilde{M}_S | 1 \leq l \leq n_1), \tilde{C}_{\Pi}, | 1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \right\} - \Pr(m) \right\}.$$
Let $E$ be the event that the case (i) occurs. Then, for $S_i$, $R_j$ and $W$, 
\[
P_{\Pi}^P(S_i, R_j, W) \leq \Pr(E) \cdot 2\delta + \Pr(\neg E) \cdot \epsilon \leq 2\epsilon, \tag{7}
\]
where the inequality (7) follows from (4) and (6). From the above, it follows that $P_{\Pi}^P \leq 3\epsilon$. Therefore, $\Pi$ is $(\omega, t_1, t_2)$-APS. □

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References


Appendix

Lemma 1: With the notations in the proof of Theorem 7, 
\[
\Pr(m|c, e_W, |M_S|_1 \leq l \leq n_1), C_R,
\]
\[
= \Pr(m|c, a, e_W, |M_S|_1 \leq l \leq n_1), \tilde{C}_R,
\]
\[
\big| \tilde{C}_R|_1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \big).
\]

Proof.

\[
\Pr(m|c, e_W, |M_S|_1 \leq l \leq n_1), C_R,
\]
\[
\big| \tilde{C}_R|_1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \big)
\]
\[
= \Pr(m|c, a, e_W, |M_S|_1 \leq l \leq n_1), C_R,
\]
\[
\big| \tilde{C}_R|_1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \big)
\]
\[
+ \Pr(m|c, e_W, |M_S|_1 \leq l \leq n_1), \tilde{C}_R,
\]
\[
\big| \tilde{C}_R|_1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \big).
\]

We first note that 
\[
\Pr(m|c, e_W, |M_S|_1 \leq l \leq n_1), \tilde{C}_R,
\]
\[
\big| \tilde{C}_R|_1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \big)
\]
\[
= 0.
\]

This is because $m$ and $a$ are independent after $(c, e_W, |M_S|_1 \leq l \leq n_1)$


\[ \leq l \leq n_1 \}, \tilde{C}_R, \{\tilde{C}_R \mid 1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \} \text{ being given.} \]

Next, we note that the following equality also holds:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pr(m|c, e_W, \{M_\Delta \mid 1 \leq l \leq n_1 \}, C_R, \\
\{C_R \mid 1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \}) \\
- \Pr(m|c, e_W, \{\tilde{M}_\Delta \mid 1 \leq l \leq n_1 \}, \tilde{C}_R, \\
\{\tilde{C}_R \mid 1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \}) \\
= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

(A-3)

In fact, the above equality (A-3) follows from the definitions of \( M_\Delta \), \( \tilde{M}_\Delta \), \( C_R \), and \( \tilde{C}_R \) (1 \( \leq l \leq n_1 \), 1 \( \leq s \leq n_2 \)). Thus, from (A-1), (A-2) and (A-3), it follows that

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pr(m|c, e_W, \{M_\Delta \mid 1 \leq l \leq n_1 \}, C_R, \\
\{C_R \mid 1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \}) \\
- \Pr(m|c, e_W, \{\tilde{M}_\Delta \mid 1 \leq l \leq n_1 \}, \tilde{C}_R, \\
\{\tilde{C}_R \mid 1 \leq s \leq n_2, s \neq j \}) \\
= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, the proof is completed. \( \square \)

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